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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Models  of  the  determinants  of  individuals’  primary  care  costs  can be  used  to  set  capitation  payments  to
providers and  to test  for horizontal  equity.  We  compare  the ability  of eight  measures  of patient  morbidity
and  multimorbidity  to predict  future  primary  care  costs  and  examine  capitation  payments  based  on
them.  The  measures  were  derived  from  four  morbidity  descriptive  systems:  17  chronic  diseases  in the
Quality  and  Outcomes  Framework  (QOF);  17  chronic  diseases  in  the  Charlson  scheme;  114  Expanded
Diagnosis  Clusters  (EDCs);  and  68 Adjusted  Clinical  Groups  (ACGs).  These  were  applied  to  patient  records
of  86,100  individuals  in 174  English  practices.  For  a given  disease  description  system,  counts  of diseases
and  sets of  disease  dummy  variables  had  similar  explanatory  power.  The  EDC  measures  performed  best
followed  by the  QOF  and  ACG  measures.  The  Charlson  measures  had  the  worst  performance  but  still
improved  markedly  on models  containing  only  age, gender,  deprivation  and practice  effects.  Comparisons
of  predictive  power  for different  morbidity  measures  were similar  for  linear  and  exponential  models,  but
the relative  predictive  power  of  the  models  varied  with  the  morbidity  measure.  Capitation  payments  forapitation
isk rating
an  individual  patient  vary  considerably  with  the  different  morbidity  measures  included  in the  cost  model.
Even for  the best  ﬁtting  model  large  differences  between  expected  cost  and  capitation  for  some  types  of
patient  suggest  incentives  for patient  selection.  Models  with  any  of  the  morbidity  measures  show  higher
cost  for  more  deprived  patients  but  the  positive  effect  of  deprivation  on  cost  was  smaller  in better  ﬁtting
models.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY  license
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p. Introduction
The relationship between patients’ primary care costs (con-
ultations, tests, drugs) and their characteristics (morbidity, age,
ender, socio-economic circumstances) is of interest for two  rea-
ons. First, primary care providers (general or family practitioners)
re increasingly paid prospectively via capitation fees to cover
he costs of patients for whom they have agreed to provide
are. Examples of health care systems with capitation payments
or general practice include Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the
etherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Ontario, and the UK (Boerma,
003; European Parliament, 1998; Sibley and Glazier, 2012). Cap-
tation payment has been advocated for primary care “medical
∗ Corresponding author.
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167-6296/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
omes” in the US (Goroll et al., 2007) and at least one US insurance
cheme has experimented with capitation payments for primary
are providers (Ash and Ellis, 2012; Ellis and Ash, 2012). If fun-
ers wish to ensure that patients with greater needs for health care
arry a larger capitation, to reduce ﬁnancial incentives for providers
o cream skim or dump patients, or to give providers incentives
o improve outcomes, then it is necessary to know how patients’
xpected cost varies with their characteristics (Schokkaert et al.,
998; Sibley and Glazier, 2012; Ash and Ellis, 2012). Despite the
rima facie importance of morbidity as a determinant of health-
are costs, most primary care capitation systems currently relate
ayments only to patient age and gender.
The second reason for interest in the relationship between the
ost of patients and their characteristics is to investigate whether
rimary healthcare resources are equitably allocated. Horizontal
quity requires that patients in equal need should receive equal
mounts of health care. Multiple regression models of cost can be
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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sed to test whether there is horizontal equity in the allocation
f primary care resources: after allowing for need, cost should not
ary with a patient’s socio-economic status (Gravelle et al., 2006;
ago d’Uva, 2005). But if the data on patient morbidity are poor, any
ssociation between socio-economic status and healthcare costs
ay  not be due to horizontal inequity but to the correlation of
ocio-economic status and unobserved aspects of morbidity.
Electronic patient records in general practices make it possi-
le to obtain very detailed information on the medical history of
atients. The raw data are so rich1 that they must be aggregated to
roduce morbidity measures which are useful for analysis.
The simplest approach is to group diagnoses into a manage-
ble number of morbidity categories which can then be included in
egression models of patient costs as a set of dummy  variables indi-
ating the presence or absence of speciﬁc diagnoses. This assumes
hat the effect of diagnoses is additive. But the cost of one patient
ith both diabetes and depression may  be greater than the cost
f two patients, one with diabetes and the other with depression,
ecause it may  be more difﬁcult to control blood sugar levels for a
epressed patient. Conversely, there may  be cost savings with some
ultimorbid patients. For example, heart disease and diabetes are
onditions where monitoring of cholesterol may  be required but
he associated costs need only be incurred once in a given period
or a patient with both conditions. Allowing for the possible non-
dditive effects of multimorbidity is potentially important since the
roportion of the population who are multimorbid is non-trivial
20% to 61% in our data set depending on the multimorbidity mea-
ure used) and has been growing over time (Hippisley-Cox and
ringle, 2007).
The raw clinical data can be combined in many ways to produce
ifferent sets of diagnostic categories and diagnostic categories can
n turn be combined in different ways to produce deﬁnitions of
ultimorbidity. A recent review (Huntley et al., 2012) found 17
ifferent multimorbidity classiﬁcation systems ranging from sim-
le counts of the number of diagnoses, as in the Charlson system, to
laborate classiﬁcation schemes such as the John Hopkins Adjusted
linical Groups (ACG) Case-Mix system (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
chool of Public Health, 2008) and the Hierarchical Conditions Clas-
iﬁcation (Pope et al., 2004).
The availability of different morbidity systems derived from the
ame raw clinical data raises a number of questions. How much do
linical measures of morbidity improve the performance of mod-
ls of patient cost compared with simpler models based on age
nd gender? Do measures which account for multimorbidity per-
orm better than simpler morbidity systems which do not allow for
ossible interactions amongst diagnoses? Does the morbidity sys-
em used affect the relative performance of different estimators?
n terms of the two policy motives for estimating cost models: how
o capitation payments based on detailed clinical measures differ
rom those based only on age and sex? Are estimates of the rela-
ionship between socioeconomic status and cost sensitive to which
orbidity system is used?
In this paper we address these questions using detailed clinical
ata from 86,100 patients in 174 English general practices. We  con-
truct eight morbidity measures which we use in linear ordinary
east squares (OLS) models and in exponential (log link, Poisson)
eneralised linear models (GLM). We  compare the goodness of ﬁt
f these models with a basic model containing only patient age,
ender, and deprivation. We  calculate capitation payments based
1 The electronic record systems in UK general practices use 85,000 Version 2
ead codes to record clinical information. The Read codes can be mapped into ICD-
0 which has over 9000 diagnostic categories in its ﬁnest classiﬁcation (excluding
hapters XX and XXII). See http://www.who.int/classiﬁcations/icd/en/.
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n different morbidity schemes and compare capitation payments
ith costs for selected types of patient. We  also compare the results
f a simple test of horizontal inequity using the different morbidity
chemes.
Our eight morbidity measures are derived from four morbid-
ty descriptive systems: 17 chronic diseases in the Quality and
utcomes Framework (QOF); 17 chronic diseases in the Charlson
cheme; 114 Expanded Diagnosis Clusters (EDCs); and 68 Adjusted
linical Groups (ACGs). The Charlson measures have the worst per-
ormance but still improve markedly on models containing only
ge, gender, deprivation and practice effects. The EDC measures
erform best followed by the QOF and ACG measures. In general,
or a given disease description system, counts of diseases and sets
f disease dummy  variables have similar explanatory power. Sim-
le counts of EDC or QOF conditions perform better than the more
laborate ACG multimorbidity measure.
Rankings of the measures are broadly similar whether the cost
odel was  linear (OLS) or exponential (GLM). However, the choice
f morbidity measure does affect the relative performance of the
wo estimation methods. OLS is better than GLM with three of the
orbidity measures, GLM is better with three, and for two of the
easures GLM and OLS have virtually identical performance.
We use the cost models to calculate capitation payment as the
ost predicted for a patient given their age, gender, deprivation
nd morbidity but removing the effect of the patient’s practice and
eplacing it by the average of the practice effects. Capitation pay-
ents, at patient and at practice level, are sensitive to the choice of
stimation method and morbidity measure. We  also ﬁnd that the
ifference between average cost and capitation for some types of
atient is often substantial, so that there are incentives for patient
election, though less than when capitation is based only on age
nd gender.
Our data do not permit the construction of sophisticated meas-
res of horizontal inequity such as the concentration index: we
re limited to simple comparisons of cost for patients in different
eprivation deciles. Comparison of primary care cost for the top and
ottom deciles of deprivation suggests that there is pro-deprived
nequity even after allowing for clinically measured morbidity. Esti-
ates of the degree of inequity depend on the morbidity measure
sed in the cost model. When only age, gender, deprivation, and
ractice effects are included the ratio of the cost of patients in the
op deprivation decile relative to those in the bottom decile is 1.50.
he ratio is reduced to 1.19 when QOF indicators are added to the
odel and to 1.15 when EDC indicators are used. Generally, the bet-
er ﬁtting is the morbidity model the smaller is the ratio of costs
or patients in the top and bottom deprivation deciles.
.1. Related literature
The ACG system has been used in studies of primary care costs
nd utilisation in Canada (Reid et al., 2001), Spain (Orueta et al.,
999), Sweden (Halling et al., 2006), the UK (Sullivan et al., 2005;
mar et al., 2008), and the US (Starﬁeld et al., 1991). Ash and
llis, 2012 applied an extended version of the Hierarchical Clini-
al Conditions morbidity system used in Medicare reimbursement
o explain the costs that primary care patients should have incurred
f managed appropriately. Some of these papers, as in Ash and
llis, 2012 have used concurrent morbidity from the period in
hich costs were incurred and report R2 over 0.5. However, for
 prospective capitation system it is necessary to examine how
ast morbidity predicts future costs. Studies using past morbid-
ty usually ﬁnd an R2 larger than 0.3, compared with an R2 below
.1 from models using only data on patient age and gender. We
uild on this previous work by comparing the predictive power
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f the ACG system with that of the QOF and Charlson morbidity
lassiﬁcations.2
Previous studies of horizontal equity in primary care have
een based on population surveys with self reported health. Bago
’Uva (2005), using the British Household Panel Survey, found that
atients with higher income had more consultations after con-
rolling for other socio-economic characteristics, and for previous
eriod patient reported health as measured by the General Health
uestionnaire, self assessed health, the number of health problems,
nd an indicator of whether health limited daily activities. Morris
t al., 2005 used data from the Health Survey for England and found
 negative but insigniﬁcant association of income and higher social
lass with consultations after controlling for current self reported
eneral health, the presence of long standing illnesses, and days of
cute illness. Generally as more measures of morbidity are included
n the analysis the degree of pro-poor inequity falls (van Doorslaer
t al., 2000). Other methods of allowing for unobserved differences
n morbidity also reduce measured pro-poor inequity. Bago d’Uva
t al. (2009) ﬁnd that using panel data to allow for unobserved
ime invariant patient differences reduces the extent of pro-poor
orizontal inequity in GP visits in most European countries, in
ome cases leading to pro-rich inequity. In Bago d’Uva et al. (2011),
sing vignettes to allow for reporting bias and objective indicators
uch as grip strength and date recall tests to instrument for self
eported health reduced the association of worse education with
ore GP visits. Because we have a more limited measure of depri-
ation (ratios of cost for patients in different deprivation deciles)
e do not attempt a full analysis of horizontal equity, but our study
omplements these previous investigations by showing that using
etailed clinical data on individual patients also reduces the extent
f pro-deprived inequity in use of primary care.
The payment system for primary care should take account of
rovider altruism, the risk imposed on providers, and the incen-
ives for supplier inducement of demand, efﬁciency in production,
election of patients, and gaming of reporting. The theoretical liter-
ture suggests that a mixed payment system is likely to be optimal,
ombining elements of fee for service and capitation payments
elated to patient characteristics (see McGuire, (2011) for a sum-
ary of the arguments). We  do not attempt to derive an optimal
ayment system but our results are relevant in that they show that
he estimation of patient cost models for the capitation component
ill be greatly improved by including detailed clinical morbidity
easures but that the choice of particular morbidity scheme will
ave marked effects on capitation for individual patients. We  also
llustrate the magnitude of potential incentives for both patient
election and gaming of reporting of patient morbidity.
The distribution of healthcare costs for individual patients usu-
lly has a long right hand tail and a spike at zero cost reﬂecting
on-use by a non trivial proportion of the population. This has led
o some debate about the appropriate estimation method for mod-
ls of individual cost with suggestions including transformation of
he cost variable, two part models, and Generalised Linear Models
GLMs) (Blough et al., 1999; Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Manning,
006; Manning and Mullahy, 2001; Manning et al., 2005; Mullahy,
998). Although our main interest is in the implications of using
etailed clinical morbidity information in cost models rather than
conometric methods, our comparisons of GLM and OLS estima-
ors contribute to the debate over healthcare cost estimators. Ours
s the ﬁrst comparison using primary care data, rather than hospital
2 Previous comparisons of the predictive power of alternative morbidity and
ultimorbidity schemes have focussed on hospital cost (Huntley et al., 2012;
inkelman and Mehmud, 2007; Perkins et al., 2004).
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r total health care costs, and it shows that the relative performance
f different estimators depends on the morbidity measure.
Section 2 describes the data and the estimation methods. The
odel results are set out in Section 3 and their implications for
apitation discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
. Methods
.1. Data
.1.1. Institutional setting
To receive primary medical care in the British National Health
ervice (NHS) patients must register with a general (family)
ractice, which also acts as gatekeeper for elective hospital care.
he NHS is ﬁnanced almost entirely from general taxation and
atients face no charges for NHS health care, apart from a small
harge for drugs prescribed in primary care. Because of the wide
ange of exemptions on grounds of age, income, and health, around
0% of drug prescriptions carried no charge in 2007/8.
.1.2. Sample
The General Practice Research Database (GPRD) contains pri-
ary care medical records for around 5 million patients currently
egistered with general practices in the United Kingdom. The GPRD
s broadly representative of the general population in the UK
Lawrenson et al., 1999).
An initial random sample of patients aged 18 years and over was
rawn from the 182 English practices included in the GPRD which
ad ‘research standard’ data continuously from 1st April 2005 to
1st March 2008, and which had given consent to link patient data
o small area measures of deprivation. The sample was stratiﬁed
y age, gender and practice. We  dropped 8 practices with entirely
issing deprivation data. To use the most up-to-date resource use
ata and the largest possible observation period for diagnoses, we
ncluded the 86,100 individuals from the original sample who  were
live and registered at one of the remaining 174 practices on 1st
pril 2007. For the regression analysis we  dropped 154 individuals
ith missing deprivation data.
.1.3. Costing
We  applied national unit costs to the numbers of consulta-
ions, prescription drugs, and tests initiated within primary care
or each patient to calculate the total cost to the NHS of primary
are resources used during the NHS ﬁnancial year 1st April 2007
o 31st March 2008. All costs were valued in £ sterling at 2007/08
rices. Details of the costing procedures are in the Data Appendix.
.1.4. Measures of morbidity and multimorbidity
We constructed eight alternative morbidity measures for each
atient (Table 1). In addition to measures based on the Quality and
utcomes Framework we  chose measures based on the Charlson
ndex and the John Hopkins ACG system because they are widely
sed internationally and straightforward to operationalise with
outine data.
QOF diseases. We  used the 17 chronic conditions included in the
linical domain of the 2006/7 version of the Quality and Outcomesractices in the UK.3 This set of morbidity markers is simple and
as high face validity as the main business of general practices is
3 We used the QOF Business Rules Version 16 which outlines the clinical Version 2
ead codes and any additional criteria required to include a patient on the relevant
OF disease register: NHS Primary Care Contracting. QOF Implementation Business
ules v16. http://www.primarycarecontracting.nhs.uk/145.php.
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Table 1
Morbidity and multimorbidity measures.
Measure Number
diseases/categories
Range of measure Details
QOF disease dummy
variables
17
Not mutually exclusive
0–1 dummies 17 chronic diseases in the clinical domain of the UK Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF) pay for performance scheme: asthma,
atrial ﬁbrillation, cancer, coronary heart disease (CHD), chronic kidney
disease (CKD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
dementia, depression, diabetes, epilepsy, heart failure, hypertension,
learning difﬁculties, mental health, obesity, stroke, and
hyperthyroidism.
QOF  disease count 17 0–17 Count of the QOF diseases.
Charlson disease
dummy  variables
17
Not mutually exclusive
0–1 dummies 17 diseases predictive of mortality: cerebrovascular disease (1),
chronic pulmonary disease (1), congestive heart disease (1), dementia
(1), diabetes (1), mild liver disease (1), myocardial infarction (1), peptic
ulcer disease (1), peripheral vascular disease (1), rheumatological
disease (1), cancer (2), diabetes with complications (2), hemiplegia and
paraplegia (2), renal disease (2), moderate or severe liver disease (3),
AIDS (6), and metastatic tumour (6). Not mutually exclusive. (Numbers
in parentheses are weights in Charlson Index score – see below.)
Charlson Index score 17 0–33 Weighted count of Charlson diseases. Weights reﬂect strength of
relationship with patient mortality.
Expanded Diagnosis
Clusters (EDCs)
dummy variables
114
Not mutually exclusive
0–1 dummies Chronic clinically related groupings of diagnoses.
Count  of EDCs 114 0–114 Count of EDCs.
Adjusted Clinical
Groups (ACGs)
68 mutually exclusive
categories
0–1 dummies Classiﬁcation into an ACG based on age, gender, combination of
morbidities, and expected cost. The age range of our sample meant we
used  only 68 out of 82 possible ACG categories.
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eResource Utilization
Bands (RUBs)
6 mutually exclusive
categories
0–1 dummies 
ealing with chronic conditions, although it omits some chronic
onditions such as skin disease and liver disease.4 The 17 QOF
orbidities were included in the regression models as 17 dummy
ariables. We  also use a count of the number of QOF morbidity
ategories as a multimorbidity measure.
Charlson diseases. The Charlson Index is a weighted sum of
7 disease dummy  variables selected for their association with
ortality (Charlson et al., 1987). About half of the 17 conditions
re similar to those in the set of QOF chronic conditions, though
he precise deﬁnitions vary. As with the QOF diseases, we esti-
ated models with dummy  variables for the 17 Charlson diseases
nd separate models with the Charlson Index as a multimorbidity
easure.5
The John Hopkins ACG Case-Mix System is also diagnosis-based
nd was developed using administrative claims data in the United
tates (Starﬁeld et al., 1991; Weiner et al., 1991). We  used the John
opkins software6 to construct four morbidity measures:
Expanded Diagnosis Clusters (EDCs) are groupings of clinically
imilar diagnostic codes. An individual was assigned to an EDC if
hey had any diagnosis relating to that EDC. We  designated 114 of
he 264 EDCs as representing a chronic condition (Salisbury et al.,
011) and measured morbidity as a vector of 114 dummy  variables.
e also counted the number of chronic EDCs in which an individual
as included as a measure of multimorbidity.
Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) are 68 mutually exclusive
ategories deﬁned by diagnoses, duration, severity, diagnostic
4 Although reported disease prevalence affects the total QOF payment, Gravelle
t  al. (2010) found no evidence that practices gamed their reporting of the preva-
ence of QOF diseases, possibly because of the auditing of QOF data by local primary
are organisations.
5 We use an adaptation by Khan et al. (2010) which provides the clinical Version
 Read codes for diagnosing each disease, using a translation from the widely used
eyo adaptation of the Charlson Index for ICD-9 codes (Deyo et al., 1992).
6 We used the John Hopkins ACG System Version 8.2 (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
chool of Public Health, 2008) to obtain the EDC classiﬁcations.
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cACGs grouped into 6 mutually exclusive Resource Utilization Bands on
the basis of expected costs; 0: No or only invalid diagnoses; 1: Healthy
Users; 2: Low; 3: Moderate; 4: High; 5: Very High.
ertainty, aetiology, age and gender.7 At least 35 ACGs are for mul-
imorbid patients.
Resource Utilization Bands (RUBs). The ACG software groups
CGs with similar expected cost into 6 Resource Utilization Bands
here higher bands are expected to have higher costs and patients
n them are more likely to be multimorbid.
Table 1 summarises the three morbidity measures (vectors of
OF, Charlson and EDC morbidity markers) and the ﬁve measures
f multimorbidity (counts of the QOF, Charlson, and EDCs mark-
rs, plus ACG and RUB categories) used in our analysis. The QOF,
harlson, and EDC morbidity categories were constructed using all
istoric diagnoses on patients’ general practice records up to 31st
arch 2007. The ACG and RUB measures use diagnoses over the
ne-year period 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2007 (John Hopkins
loomberg School of Public Health, 2008).
.1.5. Covariates
For each gender, we categorised age at 1st April 2007 into ten-
ear age bands, with 90+ years as the upper category.
The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2007 is a widely used
ummary measure of deprivation in seven dimensions (income,
mployment, health and disability, education, housing, environ-
ent, crime) for small English areas. It is derived from 38
ocioeconomic variables by a complex procedure involving fac-
or analysis, ranking, exponentiation of ranks, and standardisation
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008). It is
alculated at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)8 level. In order to
rotect patient conﬁdentiality we  were provided only with the IMD
007 decile of the LSOA in which a patient lives.
7 Though the ACG System Version 8.2 identiﬁes up to 82 default ACGs (or up to
3 with optional branching), the age range of our sample meant that some of these
ategories were not populated.
8 There are 32,482 LSOAs in England with a mean population of 1500.
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Table  2
Patient primary care costs (£) 2007/8.
Age Number Mean cost SD Median % with zero cost
Male 20–29 6021 90 367 24 29.4
30–39  7204 113 300 26 29.9
40–49  8902 168 524 40 25.9
50–59  7486 282 530 92 19.7
60–69 6481 458 622 264 8.0
70–79  4112 681 722 484 2.5
80–89  1878 822 783 608 1.9
90+  253 567 510 428 6.3
Female 20–29 5551 176 239 106 7.0
30–39  6930 210 407 110 8.0
40–49 8447 240 429 111 7.0
50–59 7525 334 515 168 5.0
60–69  6563 483 636 293 2.6
70–79  4954 639 662 463 1.6
80–89  3057 709 772 555 1.3
90+  736 673 579 528 2.2
All  patients 86,100 330 563 134 12.3
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3otes. Costs are the sum of the costs of prescriptions, tests, face to face or teleph
dministration not requiring face to face or phone contact.
Because the deprivation measure is ordered and categorical we
nter it in the regression models as a set of dummy  variables for
eciles 2–10 (most deprived). We  test for horizontal inequity by
xamining whether greater deprivation is associated with greater
r smaller cost. Because of the ordered and categorical nature of the
eprivation variable we do not compute the concentration index
hich is the standard summary measure of horizontal inequity.
Patient conﬁdentiality also meant that we were provided with
nonymised practice identiﬁers so that we could attach a practice
ummy  to each patient but had no information on practice charac-
eristics such as the GP to patient ratio.
.2. Modelling
We  estimated separate regression models of individual cost
sing the eight morbidity and multimorbidity measures. The three
umerical multimorbidity measures (QOF count, Charlson Index
core, EDC count) and the ordered RUB multimorbidity measure
ere included as dummy  variable categories to estimate the most
exible relationships between multimorbidity and cost. In our
ataset, the maximum QOF count was 10, the maximum Charl-
on score was 13, and the maximum EDC count was 28. We  used 6
ategories for the QOF count (1,2,. . .,6 or more), 7 for the Charlson
1,2,. . .,7  or more) and 18 for the EDC count (1,2,. . .,18 or more)
s there were few patients with larger numerical scores. We  used
ummy  variables for the 68 mutually exclusive ACG categories.
or the models with non-mutually exclusive QOF, Charlson, and
DC morbidity categories, we used dummy  variables for each of
he categories.
All the explanatory variables are measured at the start of the cost
ear 2007/8 with morbidity and multimorbidity variables based on
atient morbidity records up to 31st March 2007.
We report results from GLMs in which a link function of the
onditional expected 2007/8 cost of the i’th patient is linear in the
xplanatory variables:
(Eciadmp) = ˇ0 +
∑
a′
ˇa′Dia′ +
∑
d′
ˇd′Did′
+
∑
′
ˇm′Dim′ +
∑
′
ˇp′Dip′ (1)m p
he Dia are 15 age/gender group dummies, the Did are 9 deprivation
ecile dummies, the Dim are morbidity or multimorbidity category
ummies, and the Dip are 173 practice dummies.
3
fonsultations plus the costs of administration for repeat prescriptions and other
We  compare a log link (g(Ec) = ln Ec)  with a Poisson (vari-
nce equal to the mean) distribution and linear link (g(Ec) = Ec)
ith a normal distribution. The log form allows for the right
kewness of the patient cost data and use of the GLM speciﬁca-
ion means that we do not have to correct for retransformation
ias (Manning, 1998) or adjust the dependent variable because
 proportion of patients have zero cost. With a linear link
unction and a normal error distribution GLM  is equivalent
o OLS. The log link GLM speciﬁcation ln Ec = x′  ˇ or, equiv-
lently Ec = exp(x′ˇ), is also referred to as an exponential
odel.
The GLM estimators are consistent and asymptotically normally
istributed as long as (1) is valid, but the distributional assumptions
eed not be correct. For inference, robust standard errors were
alculated allowing for a general form of heteroskedasticity and
lustering of errors within practices. Models were estimated using
TATA 12.1.
We summarise model performance with four goodness of
t measures. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz,
978) penalises models with more explanatory variables. The
eviance-based R2D can be interpreted as the fraction of empiri-
al uncertainty in total patient cost which has been explained by
he model (Cameron and Windmeijer, 1997). It is equal to the
sual R2 in an OLS model. Like the BIC its value depends on the
ssumed error distribution and so cannot be used to compare
erformance of the log link Poisson GLMs with the OLS mod-
ls.
R2COR is the squared correlation coefﬁcient between the esti-
ated cost from a model and actual cost. For OLS regression models
t is equal to the usual R2 and hence to R2D. We  also compute the
ean absolute error (MAE), which is the average absolute differ-
nce in £’s between observed and estimated cost. R2COR and MAE do
ot depend on the assumed error distribution and so can be used
o compare models with the same set of explanatories but different
rror distributions.
. Results.1. Summary statistics
The average total cost per patient was £330 of which 57% arose
rom prescribed drugs, 35% from consultations, and the remaining
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Table 3
Goodness of ﬁt of alternative speciﬁcations of model for total patient cost.
Model speciﬁcation Log, Poisson Linear, Gaussian (OLS)
BIC R2
D
R2
COR
MAE BIC R2
COR
= R2
D
= R2 MAE
Age, gender (Model 1) 38446223 0.21 0.13 285 1320939 0.13 285
Age,  gender, and deprivation (Model 2) 38041309 0.22 0.13 283 1320555 0.13 284
Age,  gender, and practice (Model 3) 37725187 0.22 0.14 282 1322027 0.14 283
Age,  gender, deprivation, and practice (Model 4) 37522639 0.23 0.14 281 1321883 0.14 282
(Model 4) + QOF disease indicators 29339460 0.40 0.25 244 1302791 0.31 234
(Model 4) + QOF chronic disease count 28523441 0.42 0.29 239 1305547 0.29 240
(Model 4) + Charlson indicators 32546370 0.33 0.22 259 1310235 0.25 255
(Model 4) + Charlson Index score 32274547 0.34 0.23 258 1311982 0.23 260
(Model 4) + EDC indicators 26255449 0.46 0.29 231 1295660 0.37 222
(Model 4) + EDC count 26196861 0.46 0.32 229 1302546 0.31 236
(Model 4) + ACG 28694630 0.41 0.27 242 1308944 0.27 248
(Model 4) + RUB 30367472 0.38 0.24 250 1312522 0.23 259
N para
i elatio
R . Estim
8
w
f
g
p
C
c
b
w
t
3
3
m
c
t
G
t
m
i
b
c
t
t
b
i
a
d
m
t
p
m
m
o
p
t
3
u
p
a
t
e
p
e
T
f
m
d
O
d
a
o
t
w
o
3
b
m
c
Q
t
c
p
6
s
m
s
t
eotes. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. Smaller BIC indicates better ﬁt and is com
s  comparable for different models with same error distribution. R2
COR
: squared corr
2
COR
, the deviance based R2
D
, and the model R2 are equal. MAE: mean absolute error
% from tests and investigations.9 Table 2 shows that at most ages
omen have higher costs but costs increase more rapidly with age
or men  and are higher for men  aged 70–79 and 80–89. The age-
ender pattern is similar to those in other UK datasets for the same
eriod (Hippisley-Cox and Vinogradova, 2009; NHS Information
entre, 2008b). Like other healthcare cost data, our primary care
ost data are also right skewed (skewness 7.43, with the mean cost
eing 2.5 times the median), although the proportion of patients
ith no cost in 2007/8 is smaller (12.3%) than in typical distribu-
ions of hospital costs.
.2. Overall model performance
.2.1. Morbidity measures and model ﬁt
Table 3 shows that the inclusion of any measure of morbidity or
ultimorbidity boosts the performance of the regression models
onsiderably. For example, with age and gender groups, depriva-
ion deciles, and practice effects the R2D for the log link Poisson
LM speciﬁcation is 0.23. Adding the set of Charlson indicators,
he worst performing of the eight morbidity and multimorbidity
easures, to the model increases the R2D to 0.34. Similar increases
n performance are seen with the OLS model.
For any given estimation method, the rankings of the eight mor-
idity and multimorbidity measures by the BIC, R2D, R
2
COR and MAE
riteria are very similar. In the log link Poisson GLM speciﬁcation,
he EDC count has the best performance on all goodness of ﬁt statis-
ics closely followed by the set of 114 EDC indicators. These two EDC
ased measures are noticeably better than the QOF count, 68 ACG
ndicators, 17 QOF disease categories, and the 6 RUBs, which in turn
re markedly better than the Charlson Index score and 17 Charlson
isease categories.
Under OLS estimation, the EDC indicators have the best perfor-
ance followed by the QOF indicators and then the EDC count. The
hree sets of morbidity category dummies (EDC, QOF, Charlson)
erformed better than the corresponding count multimorbidity
easures.
It is notable that using a simple count of EDC diagnoses as a
easure of multimorbidity does better than the more complex set
f ACG categories which were designed to describe multimorbid
atients. The ACG categories also have a worse overall performance
han the count of QOF diseases.
9 Fuller summary statistics on cost are in Brilleman et al. (2011).
E
b
pble for different models with same error distribution. R2
D
: deviance based R2, which
n coefﬁcient from OLS regression of estimated cost on actual cost. For OLS models
ation sample: 85,946 patients aged 20+ in 174 practices.
.2.2. Comparison of estimation methods
For the models without any morbidity or multimorbidity meas-
res the log link Poisson models and OLS models have very similar
erformance in terms of MAE  and R2COR for any given set of covari-
tes. With any of the morbidity or multimorbidity measures, both
he log Poisson GLM and OLS estimation methods have good
xplanatory power, comparable with similar types of studies of
rimary care costs. However, the relative performance of the two
stimation methods is dependent on the morbidity measure used.
he log link Poisson GLM has lower MAE  and higher R2COR than OLS
or three of the eight models with morbidity or multimorbidity
easures, OLS does better for three, and there is essentially no
ifference for two  models.
Our results contrast somewhat with previous comparisons of
LS and GLM models for hospital costs (Gravelle et al., 2011; Van
e Ven and Ellis, 2000). This may  be because our sample is small rel-
tive to these studies,10 though our data have a smaller proportion
f zero cost patients than is usual in hospital cost studies. However,
he difference in explanatory power is not large and OLS estimation
ith the 114 EDC categories had the lowest MAE  and highest R2COR
ver all sets of explanatory variables and estimation methods.
.3. Morbidity measures: distributions and cost ratios
Tables 4–6 show the percentage of patients in different mor-
idity categories for each of the 8 morbidity and multimorbidity
easures and also the effect on cost of being in those morbidity
ategories.
The distribution of the EDC count has a larger range than the
OF chronic disease count and Charlson Index score because of
he greater number of relatively minor diseases that the EDC
ount includes. According to the QOF chronic disease count 20% of
atients were multimorbid (had a count of two or more) whereas
1% were multimorbid according to the EDC count. Women had
lightly higher scores than men  on the three count multimorbidity
easures (QOF count, Charlson Index score, EDC count). There were
igniﬁcant positive Spearman rank correlations amongst these
hree count measures (for the top censored counts used in the mod-
ls) – QOF and Charlson: 0.63; QOF and EDC: 0.72; Charlson and
DC: 0.59.
There are differences across the QOF, Charlson and EDC  mor-
idity categorisations in the proportions of patients with some
10 In Gravelle et al. (2011) models were estimated on samples of around 5M
atients.
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f the diseases. For example, 14.3% of patients have asthma in
he EDC scheme but only 6.5% in the QOF scheme. The QOF pay-
ents for asthma patients relate mainly to the monitoring of
atients and therefore patients require a recent inhaler prescrip-
ion to be classiﬁed as asthmatic, whereas EDC requires only a
iagnosis of asthma. The QOF distinguishes between asthma and
hronic obstructive pulmonary disease and so only records 2.1% of
atients as having chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, whereas
he Charlson scheme records 16.6% as having chronic pulmonary
isease because its deﬁnition includes asthmatics.
Tables 4–6 give cost ratios for the morbidity categories
rom the log link GLM model which estimates ln Ec = x′ˇ
r Ec = exp(x′ˇ). Since all explanatory variables are binary,
he cost ratio for a variable xk is the ratio of expected
ost when xk = 1 to the expected cost when xk = 0 and is
xp(ˇk * 1 +
∑
j /= kˇjxj)/exp(ˇk * 0 +
∑
j /= kˇjxj) = exp ˇk.
For multimorbidity measures (QOF count, Charlson count, and
DC count, ACGs, RUBs) which place patients in mutually exclusive
ategories, the cost ratio is relative to a zero count or to non-users.
or example, in Table 5, a patient with an EDC count of 4 has
n expected cost which is 6.13 times as large as a patient with a
ero EDC count. For the three sets of non-mutually exclusive mor-
idity dummies (QOF diseases, Charlson diseases, EDCs) the cost
atio is the cost of the disease relative to not having that disease,
ather than to not having any disease. For example, in Table 4,
 patient diagnosed as having cancer under the QOF  scheme has
n expected cost 1.74 times as large as the average patient with-
ut cancer (including those with other QOF diagnoses or no QOF
iagnosis).
Amongst the QOF morbidity categories epilepsy is the chronic
isease with the biggest relative effect (2.32 compared with no
pilepsy), though only 0.9% of the sample have the condition. The
ost common QOF condition is hypertension (18.2% of the sample)
ith a cost ratio of 1.42. All the QOF disease cost ratios are signiﬁ-
antly greater than 1 but their range is limited (1.09–2.32). The 17
harlson diseases also have a similarly limited range of cost ratios
0.98–2.43).11
Of the 114 EDCs cost ratios, 82 are signiﬁcant. All but 8 are less
han 2.0 and the largest (Transplant status) has a cost ratio of 3.6
but only 0.05% of patients are in this category). Table 5 reports
ome examplar categories.
The baseline ACG category is non-users and all other categories
ave a cost ratio in excess of 1. The results for selected ACGs in
able 6 suggest that in general patients with more morbidities have
igher costs. Cost ratios increase with RUB levels in the table, which
lso suggests that multimorbid patients are more costly as patients
n higher RUBs are more likely to be multimorbid.
The cost ratios for the three count measures increase with
he counts (except for EDC counts 14 and 17, which are slightly
maller, respectively, than EDC counts 13 and 16) implying, like
he ACG and RUB results, that patients with more diseases have
igher costs. We  re-estimated the QOF count and EDC count log
oisson models with the counts and their squares rather than
ith categories for the counts. We  found that the estimated
roportionate effect of an additional disease on the cost ratio
eclines with the number of diseases. Plots of predicted costs
gainst the EDC count, QOF count, Charlson score and RUB level
see Brilleman et al., 2011) suggests a roughly linear, rather than
xponential, effect of increasing multimorbidity on the level of
osts.
11 Patients with AIDS do not increase general practice costs signiﬁcantly because
n  the UK their care and the prescribing of AIDS drugs are generally managed in
econdary care.
116 S.L. Brilleman et al. / Journal of Health Economics 35 (2014) 109–122
Table 5
Patients and cost ratios for selected EDC categories and EDC count.
Selected EDC categories EDC count
Category % patients Cost ratio 95% CI Count % patients Cost ratio 95% CI
None 19.39 1.00 – 0 19.39 1.00 –
Low  back pain 25.80 1.10 (1.08,1.13) 1 19.56 2.11 (2.01,2.21)
Dermatitis and eczema 19.57 1.12 (1.09,1.15) 2 16.36 3.34 (3.20,3.48)
Hypertension 18.36 1.38 (1.35,1.42) 3 12.54 4.64 (4.44,4.85)
Anxiety, neuroses 16.50 1.21 (1.18,1.24) 4 9.20 6.13 (5.85,6.42)
Depression 16.21 1.29 (1.26,1.33) 5 6.75 7.73 (7.37,8.11)
Asthma 14.26 1.50 (1.46,1.54) 6 4.90 9.08 (8.65,9.53)
Cervical pain syndromes 13.20 1.10 (1.07,1.12) 7 3.51 11.01 (10.40,11.66)
Arthritis 11.17 1.13 (1.09,1.16) 8 2.41 12.16 (11.49,12.86)
Irritable bowel syndrome 6.78 1.19 (1.14,1.23) 9 1.74 13.74 (12.92,14.61)
Gastroesophageal reﬂux 6.70 1.27 (1.23,1.31) 10 1.25 15.02 (14.13,15.97)
Acute myocardial infarction 5.84 1.26 (1.22,1.30) 11 0.82 16.96 (15.81,18.20)
Malignant neoplasm of the skin 2.53 1.07 (1.02,1.12) 12 0.57 17.18 (15.89,18.58)
Malignant neoplasms, breast 1.09 1.56 (1.46,1.68) 13 0.36 19.52 (17.87,21.32)
Emphysema, chron bronchitis, COPD 2.38 1.30 (1.24,1.36) 14 0.27 19.05 (17.17,21.13)
15  0.15 21.04 (18.65,23.73)
16  0.09 24.69 (21.43,28.46)
17  0.07 24.00 (19.98,28.83)
18+ 0.08 27.60 (24.08,31.63)
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cotes. Estimates from GLM log Poisson model also including age, gender, deprivat
atient  with the relevant disease divided by the estimated cost for a patient without
ount  divided by the estimated cost for a patient with no disease (zero count).
.4. Practice effects
Including ﬁxed practice effects in the models contributes little
o model performance. Adding practice effects to models with only
ge and gender or only age, gender and deprivation increases model
2
D by at most 0.01. Dropping all the practice ﬁxed effects from the
ull EDC count model reduces the R2D by 0.02.
The practice dummy  variables pick up the effects of charac-
eristics of practices such as the GP to patient ratio, idiosyncratic
ractice treatment styles, and differences in the practice means of
oth observed and unobserved patient characteristics. The small
mpact of including practice dummies suggests that there is little
ross practice variation in the means of observed variables, and that
here is little cross practice variation in the unobserved practice
evel factors or that they have little effect.
.5. Age and genderWhen morbidity measures are included in the cost model the
ualitative pattern of the unconditional age and gender means
n Table 2 is maintained but the effects of age and gender on
ost are greatly reduced. For example, the conditional effect of
d
a
g
a
able 6
atients and cost ratios for selected ACG categories and for Resource Use Bands.
Selected ACG categories 
Category % patients Cost ratio
Non-users 9.44 1.00 
No  diagnosis or only unclassiﬁed Diagnosis 20.05 2.58 
Preventive/administrative 6.47 4.04 
Acute  minor, age 6+ 9.63 4.25 
Chronic medical: stable 2.49 7.06 
2–3  Other ADG combinations, age 35+ 9.98 8.93 
4–5  Other ADG combinations, age 45+, no major ADGs 1.83 10.90 
4–5  Other ADG combinations, age 45+, 1 major ADG 2.28 12.50 
6–9  Other ADG combinations, age 35+, 0–1 major ADG 1.52 16.32 
10+ other ADG combinations, age 18+, 2 major ADGs 0.05 21.75 
6–9  other ADG combinations, male, age 18–34, 1 major ADG 0.01 46.78 
otes. Estimates from GLM log Poisson model also including age, gender, deprivation an
he  relevant model estimated costs for a patient in the ACG (or RUB) category divided by
ombinations of diagnoses used to construct Adjusted Clinical Groups.d practice effects. Cost ratios for disease categories are the estimated costs for a
isease. Cost ratios for counts are the estimated costs for a patient with the relevant
eing male aged 80–89 is 2.38 times as large as being male aged
0–29 according to the log Poisson model with EDC morbidity cat-
gories, whereas the ratio of the unconditional mean costs is 9.13.
lder patients are more costly mainly because they are sicker than
ounger patients.
.6. Deprivation and horizontal inequity
Table 3 shows that adding the measure of patient socioeco-
omic status (small area deprivation decile) to models with age
nd gender (Model 2 vs Model 1) or models with age, gender and
ractice effects (Model 4 vs Model 3) leads to only modest improve-
ents in model ﬁt. Adding the deprivation measure to models with
orbidity has similarly small effects.
In all the models, with or without morbidity measures, patients
n higher deprivation deciles have greater cost (Table 7). The uncon-
itional cost ratio between the 10th and 1st deprivation deciles is
.50 and all the conditional cost ratios between the 10th and 1st
eprivation decile from models which include a morbidity measure
re also statistically signiﬁcantly greater than 1.00. Our  results sug-
est that there is horizontal pro-poor inequity in primary care even
fter allowing for rich clinical morbidity measures.
RUB
 95% CI Band % patients Cost ratio 95% CI
– Non-user 9.44 1.00 –
(2.40,2.77) Healthy user 36.36 3.28 (3.06,3.51)
(3.72,4.39) Low morbid 25.03 5.60 (5.22,6.01)
(3.95,4.57) Moderate 27.26 9.54 (8.90,10.23)
(6.49,7.68) High 1.70 13.44 (12.36,14.62)
(8.31,9.60) Very high 0.20 16.02 (13.81,18.58)
(10.05,11.82)
(11.56,13.51)
(15.03,17.71)
(16.90,27.99)
(20.99,104.22)
d practice effects. Cost ratios for mutually exclusive ACG categories (or RUBs) are
 the estimated cost for a patient with no use. ADGs: Adjusted Disease Groups are
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Table  7
Effect of deprivation on cost with different morbidity measures.
Model Model R2
COR
Proportionate
difference in cost
between 10th and 1st
deprivation decile
95% CI
Age/gender, deprivation, practice (Model 4) 0.14 1.50 [1.40,1.60]
Model  4 + QOF indicators 0.25 1.19 [1.12,1.27]
Model 4 + QOF count 0.29 1.20 [1.13,1.28]
Model  4 + Charlson indicators 0.22 1.33 [1.24,1.41]
Model  4 + Charlson Index 0.23 1.34 [1.26,1.43]
Model  4 + EDC indicators 0.29 1.15 [1.09,1.23]
Model  4 + EDC count 0.32 1.22 [1.15,1.29]
Model  4 + ACG categories 0.27 1.33 [1.25,1.42]
N
b
i
b
W
1
a
s
a
g
b
3
e
m
r
w
p
s
p
e
m
s
s
i
m
a
c
Q
R
d
4
m
e
d
m
p
t
b
m
c
t
b
w
t
s
a
m
o
t
a
t
t
o
l
t
m
s
t
o
5
r
p
T
w
a
h
f
o
actual cost for an individual patient is likely to overstate the incen-
tive for selection since some of the future cost of a patient is pure
noise and not predictable even with full knowledge of the patient’s
workload. The study of consultation length did not include any morbidity variablesModel 4 + RUB 0.24
otes. All models are estimated as GLM log link, Poisson. OLS results are similar.
Previous studies have found that the positive relationship
etween low socioeconomic status and utilisation of primary care
s weakened by allowing for self reported patient morbidity and
y other methods of reducing unobservable patient heterogeneity.
ith EDC indicators the estimated cost ratio is reduced from 1.50 to
.15 and 6 of the 9 ratios of cost relative to cost in the lowest decile
re not signiﬁcantly different from 1.00 at the 5% level. Table 7
hows that including other detailed clinical morbidity measures
lso reduces the cost ratio between the 10th and 1st deciles. In
eneral, the better ﬁtting is the model, the smaller is the cost ratio
etween most and least deprived deciles.
.7. Sensitivity analyses
There were some patients with extremely high costs: the high-
st four costs ranged from £15,128 to £27,810 compared to the
edian cost of £134. The use of the log link in the GLM models
educed this discrepancy considerably (the log of the highest cost
as 10.233 compared to the log of the median of 4.895). Dropping
atients above the 99th cost centile (£2471 or 7.812 in logs) led to
light improvements of all models but did not alter their relative
erformance.
We  also estimated GLM models with a log link and gamma
rror distribution (error variance proportional to the square of the
ean). In all cases, the log link gamma  models had higher MAE  and
maller R2COR than the log link Poisson models. The R
2
COR was  much
maller for the models with EDC indicators (0.03 vs 0.29) and QOF
ndicators (0.11 vs 0.25).
We experimented with a more elaborate method of measuring
ultimorbidity using the QOF disease categories, rather than using
 simple count. We  added 136 dummy  variables for each pair wise
ombination of the 17 QOF categories to the OLS model with the 17
OF categories. This led to only a small improvement in the model
2 from 0.314 to 0.324 compared to the simpler model with 17 QOF
isease categories.12
. Capitation payments and morbidity measures
Most primary care capitation systems compute capitation pay-
ents for patients using only mean costs by age and gender. Toxamine the implications of the availability of detailed morbidity
ata for capitation payments Table 8 compares capitation pay-
ents based only on age and gender (Model 1)13 with payments
12 See Brilleman et al. (2013) for a discussion of the cost implications of particular
airwise combinations of QOF conditions.
13 In the English NHS capitation fees are based on the results from two  studies of
he  determinants of consultation rates and consultation length, as measures of GP
a
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w
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b1.38 [1.30,1.47]
ased on regression models which also include patient morbidity
easures.14 We  compute a patient’s capitation as their expected
ost given their age, gender, deprivation and morbidity. To ensure
hat a patient’s capitation is not affected by which practice they
elong to we  replace the estimated effect of the patients’ practice
ith the average of the practice effects. We normalise capita-
ion payments so that they sum to total cost across the whole
ample.
Capitation payments for individual patients differ substantially
cross the six models. On the whole, capitations from models with
orbidity measures are more closely correlated with those from
ther models including morbidity (range 0.617–0.849) than with
hose based on age and gender only (range 0.490–0.677). There are
lso generally smaller average absolute differences between capi-
ations based on models including morbidity (range £81 to £154)
han between capitations from these models and capitation based
nly on age and gender (range £134 to £176). These average abso-
ute patient capitation differences across models are large relative
o the mean patient cost of £330.
The underlying model used to compute the capitation makes
uch less of a difference at practice level. To illustrate this we
how in the ﬁnal column the mean absolute differences between
otal “practice” capitation as a proportion of total cost. Because
ur 10% random sample of patients in 174 practices has just under
00 patients from each actual practice we group sample patients
andomly in 17 artiﬁcial “practices” of just over 5000 patients to
rovide a more realistic illustration of practice level differences.
he differences between total payments computed using models
ith different morbidity measures are small: the largest differences
re just over 1%.
One potential problem with capitation regimes is that practices
ave a ﬁnancial incentive to select patients if capitation differs
rom the cost which the practice expects the patient to impose
n the practice. The absolute difference between capitation andnd  the consultation rate study was based on area level data and used area measures
f mortality and of patient reported morbidity (Formula Review Group, 2007). Fund-
ng for general practice prescribing is allocated by a formula derived from a practice
evel model of prescribing costs which included three practice level disease preva-
ence measures (Department of Health, 2011). Data conﬁdentiality meant that we
ould not identify practices and so could not compare capitation based on morbidity
ith actual NHS capitation payments. Given the speciﬁcities of the NHS capitation
ystem, a comparison with simple age and gender based capitation has more general
essons.
14 To save space we do not report results with the three worst performing mor-
idity measures (Charlson indicators, Charlson Index, RUBs).
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Table 8
Capitation payments with different morbidity measures and estimation methods.
Model vs Model Individual patient capitation Practice capitation
Correlation coefﬁcient Mean patient absolute
difference between
capitation payments
(£s)
Mean total absolute
practice difference as a
proportion of practice
total cost
Age and gender only QOF disease indicators 0.571 134.3 0.0044
QOF  count 0.660 162.2 0.0085
EDC indicators 0.490 158.3 0.0053
EDC count 0.621 175.8 0.0106
ACG  0.677 153.0 0.0078
QOF  disease indicators QOF count 0.849 80.5 0.0068
EDC  indicators 0.746 104.1 0.0068
EDC  count 0.697 148.9 0.0112
ACG  0.636 150.0 0.0112
QOF  count EDC indicators 0.694 124.9 0.0087
EDC  count 0.794 136.9 0.0091
ACG  0.732 148.4 0.0056
EDC  indicators EDC count 0.803 101.4 0.0070
ACG  0.617 153.9 0.0062
EDC  count ACG 0.756 148.6 0.0100
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cotes. Capitation payments calculated from age/gender only are the age/gender m
ge/gender, deprivation decile, practice effect and morbidity, but with average pra
re  computed by randomly assigning patients to 17 “practices” of around 5056 pati
urrent medical condition. To illustrate the magnitude of potential
ncentives for patient selection, we examine the difference
etween the average capitation payment15 for particular types of
atient and their average cost.
Table 9 shows the difference between average capitation from
ifferent cost models and mean actual cost for various patient
ypes deﬁned by age, gender, diagnoses, and, in some cases, also by
eprivation.16 Patients with a diagnosis have only that diagnosis.
hus, because there are more EDC diagnoses than QOF diagnoses,
e see that there are more women aged 20–29 in the highest depri-
ation decile who have no QOF disease than have no EDC disease.
onversely, because there are more non-QOF diseases than non-
DC diseases, women aged 20–29 with no QOF disease also have
igher average cost than women aged 20–29 with no EDC disease.
apitation based only on age/gender mean costs exceeds the mean
ost of patient types with no diagnoses but is much less than mean
ost for types with high cost. For some patient types, such as men
ged 40–49 with EDC asthma, mean capitation exceeds mean costs
or all capitation calculations. For others, mean capitation is less
han mean cost by a considerable margin, for example for men  aged
0–59 with QOF obesity and diabetes. It is not however necessarily
he case that there are bigger differences between mean capitation
nd mean cost for patient types with high costs. The highest cost
ype shown (men aged 70–79 with QOF hypertension, CHD and
KD) with a mean cost of £983 has smaller selection incentives for
ll models than men  aged 50–59 with QOF obesity and diabetes
ho have a substantially smaller mean cost of £644.
Table 9 also illustrates a second potential problem with capi-
ation based on morbidity: it creates incentives to “up-code” i.e.
eport additional diseases for a patient in order to boost capitation
15 When the deﬁnition of a patient type does not depend on deprivation, patients
f  that type will have capitation which varies with their deprivation.
16 Since practice effects had little explanatory power and do not greatly affect
stimated coefﬁcients on morbidity and other explanatory variables, the capitation
ayments are very similar to predicted cost. Thus the differences between mean
osts and capitations also provide an indication of how well the model estimates
osts for particular patient types.
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(All other capitation payments are calculated from log Poisson models containing
ffects replacing the estimated effect of the patient’s practice. Practice differences
apitation payments calculated from OLS models give similar results.
ayments.17 For example, adding a diagnosis of QOF hyperten-
ion for a female patient aged 50–59 with no QOF  disease will
oost capitation based on QOF disease categories by, on average,
110.18 Under QOF count based capitation, payment will increase
y £228. Similarly adding a diagnosis of EDC hypertension to a
emale patient aged 50–59 with no EDC disease will increase capi-
ation by £31 when capitation is based on EDC indicators and £74
hen it is based on the EDC count. However, it is not always the
ase that the gains from up-coding are smaller with the ﬁner EDC
isease categorisation. Adding a diagnosis of QOF hypertension for
 man  aged 40–49 with QOF asthma boosts capitation by £31 under
OF count based capitation, but adding a diagnosis of EDC hyper-
ension for a man  aged 40–49 with EDC asthma increases capitation
y £66 under EDC count based capitation.
Capitation based only on age and gender creates bigger incen-
ives for patient selection than capitation based on cost models
hich also include individual morbidity measures. By contrast mis-
oding is less of a problem under age and gender based capitation
ince it is easier for funders to audit the age and gender of patients
ather than their morbidity.
. Conclusion
.1. Discussion
Adding measures of individual patient morbidity produces a
onsiderable boost in the explanatory power of cost models. Using
ner categories of morbidity improves the prediction of patient
osts. Thus measures using the 114 EDC categories were bet-
er than those using the 17 category QOF scheme, whether the
ategories were used to measure morbidity as a set of dummy
ariables or used to construct counts of disease categories to mea-
ure multimorbidity. The QOF based measures of morbidity and
17 Most health care systems have a large enough number of practices to ensure
hat  no single practice would be able to inﬂuence the estimated model coefﬁcients,
nd hence the capitation formula, by strategic reporting.
18 Under the QOF indicators model the capitation for a women aged 50–59 with
o QOF disease is £221 (mean cost £175, plus the £46 excess of average capitation
ver mean cost) and for a woman aged 50–59 with QOF hypertension it is £331
mean cost £350 plus the −£19 excess of average capitation over mean cost).
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Table  9
Difference between capitation and average cost for selected patient groups.
Patient type N patients % of sample Mean cost Average capitation from model minus mean cost
Age/gender
mean
QOF
indicators
QOF count EDC indicators EDC count ACG
Female, 20–29, deprivation
decile 10, no QOF disease
546 0.64% 145 31 14 −13 21 14 33
Female, 20–29, deprivation
decile 10, no EDC disease
198 0.23% 103 73 60 43 25 −40 39
Female, 50–59, no QOF
disease
3787 4.41% 175 159 −15 46 42 51 84
Female, 50–59, QOF
hypertension
439 0.51% 350 −16 −19 38 −10 26 11
Female, 50–59, no EDC
disease
1003 1.17% 91 243 79 133 −25 78 100
Female,  50–59, EDC
hypertension
113 0.13% 155 179 96 70 45 −15 88
Male,  40–49, QOF asthma 270 0.31% 270 −101 −63 −6 −62 −29 −53
Male,  40–49, QOF asthma
and hypertension
21 0.02% 548 −379 −231 −129 −258 −215 −250
Male,  40–49, EDC asthma 188 0.22% 102 67 46 37 31 11 46
Male,  40–49, EDC asthma
and hypertension
10 0.01% 155 14 13 22 6 24 24
Male,  50–59, QOF obesity &
diabetes
49 0.06% 644 −363 −213 −77 −213 −171 −231
Male,  70–79, QOF
hypertension & CHD
110 0.13% 755 −74 −83 66 −61 −3 3
Male,  70–79, QOF
hypertension, CHD &
CKD
30 0.03% 983 −302 −27 73 16 −29 −96
Male,  20–29, EDC
dermatitis/eczema &
anxiety/neuroses
28 0.03% 106 −16 −11 −6 −7 15 2
Female, 40–49, EDC IBS 63 0.07% 122 118 75 58 43 0 66
Female, 40–49, EDC IBS &
depression
28 0.03% 201 39 20 24 −4 −8 26
Female, 20–29, deprivation
decile 10, ACG category:
No Diagnosis or Only
Unclassiﬁed Diagnosis
106 0.12% 131 45 35 46 19 45 −36
Male,  70–79, ACG category:
Chronic Medical: Stable
161 0.19% 620 61 150 158 −17 92 33
Notes. Capitation payments calculated from age/gender only are the age/gender means. All other capitation payments are calculated from log Poisson models containing
age/gender, deprivation decile, practice effect and morbidity, but with average practice effects replacing the estimated effect of the patient’s practice. Capitation payments
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aalculated from OLS models give similar results. IBS: irritable bowel syndrome.
ultimorbidity performed considerably better than the Charlson
ased measures which had the same number of morbidity cate-
ories. The poor performance of the widely used Charlson Index
core and of the Charlson disease dummy  variables may  be because
he Charlson scheme was originally intended to predict mortal-
ty rather than the cost of general practice activities. The two  QOF
ased measures had about the same predictive power as the 68
utually exclusive ACG categories derived using purpose built
ase-mix software. This may  be because the 17 QOF categories were
elected for a primary care pay for performance scheme targeted at
are for chronic patients who are the main business of general prac-
ices. The ACG categories included non-chronic diagnoses which
ere grouped in part by their anticipated effect on all patient costs,
ncluding hospital costs.
We found that the morbidity measure had an effect on the rel-
tive performance of the OLS and GLM log link Poisson estimators
lthough the differences in performance for a given morbidity mea-
ure were not large. The choice of morbidity measure has a bigger
mpact on model performance than the choice of estimator.Although we were limited to a fairly crude ordered categorical
nd summary measure of socio-economic status, our results are
n line with the previous literature: more deprived patients had
reater cost but the association became weaker when morbidity
g
i
b
peasures were included in the cost model. The better ﬁtting the
ost model, the smaller was  the association between deprivation
nd cost.
A major reason for interest in predicting primary care cost is
o inform the calculation of capitation payments. We  found that
apitation payments for individuals vary considerably with the
orbidity system used in the cost models, though the choice of
orbidity system had much less effect on total payments to prac-
ices.
There were considerable potential capitation increases from up-
oding, i.e. from overstating the number of diagnoses for patients
hen capitation was  based in part on morbidity. Conversely, incen-
ives for patient selection were reduced markedly when morbidity
nformation was  used to calculate capitation payments. However,
ven when capitation was  based on models including morbidity
easures the difference between average capitation and average
ost for certain types of patient was still sizeable compared to aver-
ge patient costs.
The models were estimated on data from a sample of English
eneral practices. However, similar data are increasingly available
n other countries and our conclusions, that morbidity measures
ased on detailed clinical records greatly improve the ability to
redict primary care costs but that choice of measure affects both
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he performance of the cost model and the individual capitation
ayments based on it, are likely to apply in other health care sys-
ems.
The ACG and Charlson morbidity categories were originally
erived and calibrated on US data and the QOF categories were
eveloped as part of a UK pay for performance scheme. The
nstitutional differences across countries mean that the choice
f morbidity measure for computing capitations requires inves-
igation using country speciﬁc data. It would also be useful to
xamine alternative methods of producing summary morbidity
easures from the very detailed raw clinical information on indi-
idual patients, including, for example, factor analysis (Fang et al.,
008). These investigations would also be improved by richer socio-
conomic data than we were able to use and by panel data to allow
or unobserved patient factors. Given the importance of prescrip-
ion costs it may  also be useful to examine how much separate
odelling of prescribing and other costs would improve predictive
ower.
.2. Simpler is better?
The best performing multimorbidity measures were simple
ounts of the number of chronic conditions patients suffered from
r simple sets of disease dummies. It is notable that using an 18 cat-
gory count of EDC diagnoses as a measure of multimorbidity does
etter than the more complex set of 68 ACG categories which were
esigned to describe multimorbid patients. The ACG categories also
ave a worse overall performance than the seven category count
f QOF diseases. It is possible that, when morbidity descriptive sys-
ems are designed to predict cost in a speciﬁc institutional setting,
ore elaborate schemes will do better than simple ones. But sim-
licity has other virtues. Simpler morbidity and multimorbidity
chemes are easier for patients and GPs to understand. Setting cap-
tation fees based on morbidity requires that patient morbidity be
easured every budgetary period for every patient and more com-
lex schemes have higher measurement and computation costs.
hus there may  be a trade-off between simplicity and predictive
ower when alternative morbidity measures are considered.
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ppendix A. Data Appendix
We  calculated the total cost of primary care resources used by
ach patient during the NHS ﬁnancial year 1st April 2007 to 31st
arch 2008 by applying national average unit costs to the num-
ers of consultations, prescription drugs, and tests initiated within
rimary care. All costs were valued in £ sterling at 2007/08 prices.
Consultations included all face-to-face (including surgery
onsultation, home visit, clinic, out of hours) and telephone con-
ultations. The unit cost of each consultation was  based on a
C
t
ﬁ Economics 35 (2014) 109–122
ombination of consultation type and primary staff role (type of
eneral practitioner, practice nurse or other health care profes-
ional leading the consultation). The unit costs for consultations
re shown in Table A1. They include costs of administrative activ-
ties such as the recording of results or sending mail to a patient
hen this was performed by a receptionist, administrator, or sec-
etary. Unit costs were taken from Curtis, 2008 and from a report
n national average GP earnings and expenses based on GP tax
eturns (Technical Steering Committee, 2010). The unit costs in
urtis, 2008 are derived by estimating a national average annual
ost for each type of staff, dividing by the national average number
f hours worked per year, and combining this cost per hour with an
stimated average encounter time for each type of staff. The costs
nclude salaries, training costs, and premises.
Although payments to a practice vary with performance under
he QOF and with the prevalence of QOF diseases in the practice,
he unit costs used to cost primary care activity in a particular
ractice are based on national average payments to GPs and so are
ot affected by the prevalence of QOF diseases in that practice.
Unit costs for prescription drugs were based on information
rovided by the GPRD which combined data from several sources,
ncluding the National Drug Tariff for generic products, and man-
facturers for branded products. Each prescription drug in the
atient level data was matched to unit cost using drug name,
trength and formulation. Where there was more than one unit
ost for a prescription drug we used the median unit cost.
To allow for possible ambiguities in the mapping of recorded
rug quantities to costs we also computed a measure of prescrip-
ion costs using data from the prescription cost analysis of the NHS,
008a which provides information on the net ingredient cost of all
rescriptions dispensed in the community in England. We  used the
ritish National Formulary (BNF) code (BRM, 2010) to attach these
verage costs to each prescription in the GPRD data, ignoring the
uantity speciﬁed in the prescription. Our results are not sensi-
ive to the method for calculating prescribing costs. Using national
verage amounts per prescription rather than recorded amounts
o calculate total primary care costs reduced model performance
omewhat but estimated effects were similar and the model rank-
ngs were unchanged. Ambiguities in the recording of the amount
f a given drug prescribed will have only small effects on practice
apitation based on the coefﬁcients from estimated cost models
nd will not create incentives for misreporting of morbidity.
Estimated drug costs use data on prescriptions issued by the
ractice, not on drugs actually dispensed to patients, as NHS data
ystems for dispensing are primarily used to remunerate pharma-
ists. Not all prescriptions issued to patients result in the dispensing
f medicines. One study estimated that 5.2% of prescriptions writ-
en in a general practice were not dispensed (Beardon et al., 1993).
ur drug costs are therefore an overestimate. Whether this results
n biased estimates of the effects of morbidity and other vari-
bles depends on whether the propensity to have prescriptions
ispensed is correlated with the explanatory variables.
With advice from a general practitioner member of the research
eam (SP) we determined which tests were performed within a
tandard surgery consultation and applied a zero unit cost, save for
he cost associated with any consumables such as pregnancy test
its or urine dipsticks. Unit costs for the remaining tests were based
n the National Health Service (NHS) Reference Costs (Department
f Health, 2009). For laboratory tests the unit cost was  based
n pathology discipline. Hospital-based tests and investigations
equested by the practice were costed using the NHS Reference
osts.
We included cost data for patients who  were alive and regis-
ered with our sample practices on 1st April 2007 at the start of the
nancial year 2007/8. We  made no adjustment for patients who
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Table  A1
Unit costs (£, 2007/08) per primary care encounters.
Staff type Surgery
consultation
Home visit Clinic Telephone
consultation
Out of hours
GP: partner 24.47 81.37 35.98 14.85 36.97
GP:  registrar/associate 15.92 52.92 23.40 9.66 24.05
GP:  sole practitioner 27.55 91.61 40.51 16.72 41.63
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MPractice nurse 9.00 – 
Counsellor 64.00 – 
Other  health care professional 15.00 – 
eregistered from the practice list during the resource use year.
hus if patients moved to another practice during the year, their
otal primary care costs deﬁned to include those incurred in other
ractices, would be under recorded in our data. If the aim is to esti-
ate future costs which will be incurred by the practice in which
he patient is initially registered this does not present a problem. On
verage, setting capitation fees based on our results would ensure
hat practices would be paid for costs actually incurred by patients
n their list at the start of the year. A retrospective adjustment could
e made at the end of the ﬁnancial year for costs attributable to
ewly registered patients. We  also make no adjustment for patients
ho die. Such patients may  have higher costs but to the extent that
he morbidity measures are correlated with mortality in the com-
ng year the estimated effects of different types of morbidity will
nclude some of the differentially higher costs of patients at higher
isk of death.
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